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the criminal law
by Michael Brindle QC
Michael Brindle QC dicusses the UK statutory provisions relating 
to money laundering and examines differing views on the scope of 
their application to the complex areas of tax evasion and foreign 
fiscal offences.
E veryone has an instinctive concept of money laundering: the handling of the proceeds of crime, its disguise and apparently regular transfer within the banking system. It 
was for this sort of activity that EC Directive 91/308, OJ 1991 
L166/77, came into existence. In the UK, those involved in 
money laundering can be pursued through the criminal courts; 
s. 93A, 93B and 93C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 ('CJA 
1988'), enacted through s. 29-31 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 
('CJA 1993'), provide the necessary legislation.
It is, however, abundantly clear that the UK legislature 
decided to go significantly further than it was required to do by 
the EC directive. Article 15 of the directive specifically permits 
member states to adopt stricter provisions than the directive 
itself demands, and this is precisely what happened in the UK. 
There is nothing objectionable about this either in European law 
or in UK constitutional law, but the results are striking.
The key section is 93A, which provides as follows: 
'Assisting another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct
93A. (1) Subject to subsection (3) below, if a person enters into or 
is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby 
(a) the retention of control by or on behalf of another ("A") 
of A's proceeds of criminal conduct is facilitated 
(whether by concealment, removal from the 
jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise); or
(b) A's proceeds oj criminal conduct 
(i) are used to secure that funds are placed at A's 
disposal; or
(ii) are used for A's benefit to acquire property by way 
of investment,
knowing or suspecting that A is a person who is or has been engaged 
in criminal conduct or has benefited from criminal conduct, he is 
guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section, references to any person's proceeds of criminal 
conduct include a reference to any property which in whole or in part
directly or indirectly represented in his hands his proceeds of criminal 
conduct.
(3) Where a person discloses to a constable a suspicion or belief that 
any funds or investments are derived from or used in connection with 
criminal conduct or discloses to a constable any matter on which such 
a suspicion or belief is based- 
fa) the disclosure shall not be treated as a breach of any
restriction upon the disclosure oj information imposed
by statute or otherwise; and
(b) if he does any act in contravention of subsection (1) 
above and the disclosure relates to the arrangement 
concerned, he does not commit an offence under this 
section if 
(i) the disclosure is made before he does the act 
concerned and the act is done with the consent of the 
constable; or
(ii) the disclosure is made after he does the act, but is 
made on his initiative and as soon as it is reasonable 
for him to make it.
(4) In proceedings against a person for an offence under this section, 
it is a defence to prove 
(a) that he did not know or suspect that the arrangement 
related to any person's proceeds of criminal conduct; or
(b) that he did not know or suspect that by the 
arrangement the retention or control by or on behalf of 
A of any property was facilitated or, as the case may be, 
that by the arrangement any property was used, as 
mentioned in subsection (1) above; or
(c) that-
(i) he intended to disclose to a constable such a 
suspicion, belief or matter as is mentioned in subsection 
(3) above in relation to the arrangement; but
(ii) there is reasonable excuse for his failure to make 
disclosure in accordance with subsection (3)(b) above.
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(5) In the case of a person who was in employment at the relevant 
time, subsections (3) and (4) above shall have effect in relation to 
disclosures, and intended disclosures, to the appropriate person in 
accordance with the procedure established by his employer for the 
making of such disclosures as they have effect in relation to 
disclosures, and intended disclosures, to a constable.
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment Jor a term not 
exceeding six months or a Jine not exceeding the 
statutory maximum or to both; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment Jor a 
term not exceeding fourteen years or a Jine or to both.
(7) In this Part of this Act "criminal conduct" means conduct which 
constitutes an offence to which this Part of this Act applies or would 
constitute such an offence if it had occurred in England and Wales or 
(as the case may be) Scotland. ".'
' (2) In section 102(1) of the Act of 1988 (interpretation of Part VI), 
the Jollowing definition shall be inserted after the dejinition oj 
"interest" 
'proceeds of criminal conduct', in relation to any person who 
has benefited from the criminal conduct, means that benefit;".
(3) In section 102(2) of the Act of I 988, the Jollowing entry shall be 
inserted in the table after the entry relating to section 71 (9)(a) 
"Criminal conduct section 93A(7)".'
GENERAL SCOPE
This clearly goes well beyond money laundering in the 
ordinary sense. Subsection (7) extends to all indictable offences, 
so that those involved in assisting another to retain the benefit of 
any indictable criminal conduct are liable to prosecution. This 
includes the proceeds of any offences under the Theft Acts 1968 
and 1978, all offences of conspiracy, forgery or counterfeiting, 
as well as offences which are not essentially financial at all, 
provided only that they give rise to 'proceeds'.
Concept of 'proceeds'
An important restriction upon the ambit of the new legislation 
is the concept of 'proceeds'. A's criminal conduct must have 
created 'proceeds' which are defined by s. 29(2) of the 1993 Act 
as follows:
'"Proceeds of criminal conduct", in relation to any person who has 
benefited from criminal conduct, means that benefit'.
Although this is in a sense a wide definition, there are many 
crimes which do not give rise to 'proceeds' at all. This is highly 
relevant to revenue offences, but even in non-fiscal conspiracies 
the immediate financial benefit may not be easy to determine. 
Section 71(4) and (5) of the 1988 Act defined 'benefit' to 
include 'any pecuniary advantage obtained from or in 
connection with "criminal conduct"', and there seems no reason 
to give the particular limited definition to 'pecuniary advantage' 
which is found in s. 16 of the Theft Act 1968 and in the later Theft 
Act of 1978. Even with this wide definition, however, in order for 
anybody to be guilty of criminal conduct under s. 93A, he has to 
have assisted in the retention of something which can be defined 
as representing the proceeds of criminal conduct.
Criterion of assistance
The other principal limitation on the scope of s. 93A is the 
requirement that the person in question should have rendered 
assistance. There is no whistle-blowing duty imposed by the 
section. Someone who merely stands by and observes does not 
commit an offence (although drugs and terrorism are 
different). The retention of control of the proceeds of criminal 
conduct must have been 'facilitated'. Concealment is a 
sufficient form of facilitation, but this clearly requires active 
participation in the criminal conduct or the laundering of the 
proceeds thereof. However, the way in which the section is 
drafted merits attention. Even if the assistance provided is 
entirely innocent, it comes within s. 93A if the assister knows 
or suspects that A is a person who has been engaged in criminal 
conduct in the past, even if he does not know or suspect that 
the transaction in question is tainted in any way. Thus, to render 
innocent assistance to a known or suspected criminal risks 
liability. In such circumstances it is open to the assister 
positively to prove, under subsection (4), that he did not know 
or suspect that the arrangement in question actually related to 
A's proceeds of criminal conduct, but here the burden is on the 
assister to disprove what is otherwise a completed criminal 
offence. The prosecution has done its task in creating the 
elements of criminal liability by showing:
  the fact of assistance in retention of control; and
  the knowledge or suspicion by the assister that A had in the 
past been engaged in criminal conduct.
Knowledge and suspicion are obviously broad concepts. 
Suspicion is sufficient, and, in the case of investment or tax 
advisers, as well as certain legal advisers, it is possible to take the 
view that the adviser should be suspicious in almost all 
circumstances when a large sum of money appears from no very 
clearly defined source.
How widely, however, will the courts interpret the concept of 
'suspicion'? It is likely that they will require more than simply 
the world-weariness of the experienced professional financial 
or tax adviser. If the case were to come before the criminal 
courts, solid evidence would be required on which to ground 
any suspicion of engagement in criminal conduct. An 
investment, tax or legal adviser will often have only partial 
knowledge of a client's affairs, and in such circumstances the 
court would be keen to ensure that unreasonable and unfair 
burdens were not imposed upon the professional. Conversely, 
where a client has delegated the conduct of his financial affairs 
to such a person, it will be much more difficult for that 
professional to deny sufficient knowledge of the client's affairs. 
It will be necessary to see howr the law develops, but it is 
interesting to note that, in the parallel area of civil liability, the 
Privy Council has made it clear that professionals should only be 
liable for compensation under the 'knowing assistance' head of 
constructive trusteeship where dishonesty can be shown (see 
Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 3 AEL ER 97, PC). Clearly, 
criminal and civil law are different and there is no reason why 
different results should not be obtained, but it would be 
somewhat paradoxical if professional advisers could be held 
guilty of criminal conduct in circumstances where they would 
not be liable for compensation in a civil court.
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Divergence of opinion among judges
Even if the parallel with civil liability is adopted, there is some 
divergence between the opinions of judges as to how dishonesty- 
is to be assessed. In Agip (Africa) Ltd vJackson [1990] 1 Ch 265, 
Millett J (as he then was) said the following at p. 294h:
'What did Mr Jackson and Air Griffin think was going on? There is 
some evidence of this in the Minutes of the first meeting of the Directors 
of Keelward Limited of 22 March 1 984 and it will be wrong of me to 
ignore it. This suggests that they thought that their clerk was engaged 
in evading Tunisian Exchange Gjntrol, possibly with the connivance of 
the plaintiffs and on their behalf  though the Minutes do not say so. 
In my judgment, however, it is no answer for a man charged with 
having knowingly assisted in a fraudulent and dishonest scheme to say 
he thought that it was 'only' a breach of exchange control or 'only' a 
case of tax evasion. It is not necessary that he should have been aware of 
the precise nature of the fraud or even of the identity of its victim. A 
man who consciously assists others by making arrangements which he 
knows are calculated to conceal what is happening from the third party, 
takes the risk that they are part of a fraud practised on that party.'
KNOWLEDGE AND SUSPICION
Knowledge and suspicion are obviously broad concepts. 
Suspicion is sufficient, and, in the case of investment or tax 
advisers, as well as certain legal advisers, it is possible to take 
the view that the adviser should be suspicious in almost all 
circumstances when a large sum of money appears from no 
very clearly defined source.
How widely, however, will the courts interpret the concept of 
'suspicion'? It is likely that they will require more than simply 
the world-weariness of the experienced professional financial 
or tax adviser. If the case were to come before the criminal 
courts, solid evidence would be required on which to ground 
any suspicion of engagement in criminal conduct.
A different view was taken by Rimer J in Brinks Ltd v Elcombe 
(The Times, 23 October 1995) although it does not seem that 
he was referred to the remarks of Millett J. I have little doubt 
that the courts, both civil and criminal, would be likely for the 
most part to follow the views of Millett J. If a professional person 
knows or suspects that his or her client is involved in some form 
of dishonest and criminal activity, it is a very uncertain defence 
to say that he or she did not spot the precise form of dishonest 
and criminal activity actually being perpetrated.
OFF-SHORE ACTIVITIES
The most remarkable feature of the new legislation is its
o
extension, through s. 93A(7), to the facilitation of criminal 
conduct taking place outside the UK. It should be noted that 
Part I of the 1993 Act, which has not yet been brought into 
effect, seeks to extend the jurisdiction of the UK courts in 
respect of offences with significant foreign elements. Part III of 
the 1993 Act deals with money laundering. Section 93A (7) 
(cited above) reads as follows:
'In this part of this Act "criminal conduct" means conduct which 
constitutes an offence to which this Part of this Act applies or would 
constitute such an offence if it had occurred in England and Wales or 
(as the case may be) Scotland.'
This clearly means that if there were, for instance, a theft in 
France and an attempt to launder the proceeds of that theft in 
England, then Part III of the 1993 Act would apply. The 
potential defendant cannot console himself, when faced with the 
knowledge or suspicion of criminal conduct, by the reassurance 
that such conduct is only criminal in a foreign country if, had the 
conduct occurred in England, it would have been criminal here. 
This is readily understandable, and an integral part of the process 
of combating international money laundering.
A problem immediately arises, however. How far must the 
potential defendant go in acquainting himself with foreign 
criminal law systems? Interestingly, s. 93A(7) does not enact a 
'double criminality' test at all, since (remarkably) it is not 
necessary that the conduct taking place abroad should actually 
constitute criminal conduct there, only that it would constitute an 
indictable offence if it had occurred in England and Wales, or 
Scotland. Thus, the relevant conduct is notionally transferred 
from the foreign country to England, Wales or Scotland and 
treated accordingly, irrespective of the governing foreign law. 
Thus, it does not seem to be incumbent on a professional 
investment manager, tax adviser or lawyer to acquaint him or 
herself with any foreign criminal law at all. Conversely, 
knowledge of English (or Scottish) criminal law is at a premium 
since all foreign conduct must notionally be tested according to 
the English or Scottish criminal law.
How far does this go, however? If 'X' and 'Y' have conspired 
in France to rob a German bank, what 'conduct' is it which is 
notionally transferred to England? Is it simply the conspiracy, 
hatched in France, to rob the German bank, or is an English 
bank substituted for the actual German bank? Such questions are 
not addressed by the legislation. However, in the field of 
extradition (see below) similar provisions of the Fugitive Offenders 
Act 1967 have been construed narrowly, so that where conduct 
in 'Country A' is directed at defrauding persons in 'Country B', 
only the acts carried out in 'Country A' are notionally treated as 
having taken place within the jurisdiction of England, as the 
extraditing jurisdiction (R v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex pane 
Osman [1989] 3 ALL ER 701 at 713F to J). If, however, the 
conspiracy were hatched in France to rob a French bank, then 
the same authority would indicate that, at least for the purposes 
of the law of extradition, both the conspiracy and the fraud 
would be notionallv transferred to England.J O
TAX
It is here that the problem arises as to the application of 
s. 93(A), and the other related sections, to fiscal offences. This 
has two elements: first, whether the legislation applies to fiscal 
offences at all and, secondly, how, if at all, it applies to foreign 
fiscal offences.
Although clearly not specifically envisaged when the legislation 
was passing through Parliament (see Hansard, 14 April 1993, 
859 870) there is nothing in the act which excludes its 
application to fiscal offences, many of which will fall squarely 
within the definition that forms the essential framework for the 
scope of the relevant provisions. It is worth noting that s. 1 of 
Part I of the 1993 Act, in defining the offences to which Part I 
when brought into force would apply, specifically includes the 
common law offence of 'cheating' in relation to the publicO 1
revenue. This clearly refers to the UK revenue authorities, rather
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than any foreign authorities, but nevertheless provides some 
support for the idea that the definition of indictable offences in 
Part III cannot exclude fiscal offences.
The remarks above concerning the concept of 'proceeds' 
indicate the difficulty in applying the legislation to fiscal offences. 
For the most part, fiscal crime is not fund-specific   that is to say 
that the evasion of tax does not normally result in specifically 
identifiable 'proceeds' which may thereafter be the subject of 
laundering activities. There may be exceptions to this, for 
instance in the case of PAYE obligations where an employer is 
required to make deductions from remuneration before handing 
it over to an employee: if the sum is paid gross, it is arguable that 
the excess element paid is the 'proceeds' of a tax evasion. This 
will not generally be the position. Even the extended definition of 
proceeds to include any benefit from criminal conduct will still be 
difficult to apply in the case of most tax evasion. It can hardly be 
the law that any sums retained by the tax evader, which might 
have been used to pay his or her taxes, represent the 'proceeds', 
but, if not, it is difficult to see which particular funds would 
qualify. This indicates that the legislation was not drafted to take 
account of fiscal offences, although it is not sufficient argument 
for excluding tax offences altogether.
FOREIGN TAX
An acute problem arises as to the application of the legislation 
to foreign tax evasion. Assume that 'A', a resident Frenchman, 
has evaded tax due to the French revenue authorities and 
thereafter approaches an English professional to assist him in 
investing or otherwise dealing with the 'proceeds'. Leaving aside 
the difficulty set out above as to the meaning of the term 
'proceeds' in this connection, is the English professional 
concerned at all with any knowledge or suspicion which he 
might have as to the evasion of foreign tax?
There are two.powerful reasons why he is not concerned with 
such matters. The first arises out of the construction of 
s. 93A(7): does one transfer (notionally) from France to England 
both the activity constituting the tax evasion and also the French 
revenue authorities themselves, substituting those authorities by 
the English authorities? If so, would it make any difference if the 
Frenchman, and his activities within France, had been directed 
towards defrauding the German tax authorities? Does the
o
translation of the French activity to England bring with it the 
substitution of the German authorities by the English 
authorities?
No answer is provided by the 1993 Act. As a matter of 
statutory construction, it would seem that in neither case would 
it be legitimate to substitute the English tax authorities for those 
of either France or Germany. Section 93A(7) refers only to the 
translation of conduct that has occurred abroad. The occurrence 
of events is one thing, the replacement of a foreign victim by a 
notional English victim is another. However there must be some
O
limits to this approach. Simple theft of money in France will 
necessarily involve a victim, who will probably be a Frenchman. 
Surely s. 93A(7) cannot be disapplied simply because of the need 
to substitute an English victim for the French one? If that is 
right, what is the difference between the ordinary case of thefto J
and the case of tax evasion?
It seems to me that there is a difference. In the case of theft, 
the identity of the victim is irrelevant to the nature and
characteristics of the offence of theft. In the case of tax evasion, 
however, the particular relationship between the tax evader and 
his local tax authority may well differ widely between different 
jurisdictions. In some countries it may be incumbent on a tax 
payer to volunteer a tax return, giving full and frank information 
about his financial affairs, whilst in another it may be up to the 
tax authorities to find the facts and impose a tax charge on the 
individual. The nature and extent of taxpayers' obligations vary 
considerably throughout the world, as do the nature and extent 
of the different taxes which different countries impose on 
different persons for different reasons. The translation of a 
foreign tax authority into an English one is not a straightforward 
matter at all. If the 1993 Act had clearly intended to apply to 
foreign tax evasion, clearer words than those to be found in 
s. 93A(7) would have been appropriate. For the English criminal 
court to ignore the particular requirements and characteristics of 
a foreign revenue authority and simply proceed as if the Inland 
Revenue were involved, is to overlook the particular 
characteristics of the foreign revenue authority. Since, as pointed 
out above, there is no 'double criminality' requirement, such an 
approach would render the particular characteristics and 
requirements of the foreign revenue authority irrelevant, and the 
criminality of the assistance and the retention of the proceeds of 
criminal conduct would be judged entirely on the basis of an 
artificial assumption that the foreign revenue authority is to be 
equated in all respects with the UK Inland Revenue. It is 
questionable whether the statute is sufficiently clearly defined to 
achieve this improbable purpose.
Support is given to these doubts as to the application of the 
legislation to foreign tax evasion by reference to the established 
principle of English law, most clearly to be found in the decision 
of the House of Eords in Government of India v Taylor [1955] AC 
491. Claims on behalf of a foreign state to recover taxes due 
under its fiscal laws are unenforceable in English courts. In 
relation to civil proceedings it is often said that the English courts 
are not concerned with evasions of foreign revenue law. This is a 
principle deeply imbedded in English law, as recently re-affirmed 
by the Court of Appeal in Comdex International Ltd v The Bank of 
Zambia (No.3) [1997] 6 Bank LR 43. Surely the indictment in 
England of persons alleged to be guilty of assistance in retention 
of the proceeds of foreign tax evasion would amount, in reality, to 
the enforcement of foreign revenue laws, and fall foul of the 
principle in the Government of India case? Taken together with the 
points made above as to the meaning of the words used in s. 
93A(7), there seems to be a powerful case for arguing that the 
legislation does not apply at all if the only criminal conduct in 
question is the evasion of foreign revenue law.
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Many cases concerning the evasion of foreign revenue law will 
also involve other criminal activity, in particular false accounting, 
and possibly other general criminal offences. Clearly, if false 
accounting is involved then the fact that the books of account 
were wrongly written up in a foreign country, rather than in 
England, will not provide any escape from s. 93A. Nor will it 
matter at all that the false accounting occurred in the general 
context of an attempt to evade tax. The interesting case, 
however, is one of 'pure' tax evasion, where no other offence is 
committed except the infringement of certain specific foreign 
revenue legislation. It is reasonably clear that the potential 
defendant need not be concerned with the precise details of that 
foreign law, but can he or she be held criminally responsible in 
England if he or she performs acts of assistance in England in 
respect of what would have been an offence against the UK 
Inland Revenue had the act been carried out here? It seems to 
me that the answer is 'no'. The absence of a double criminality 
test under s. 93A(7) (in contra-distinction to the Money 
Laundering Regulations 1993) reinforces this conclusion. Where 
s. 93A(7) applies, it does not actually matter whether there is 
ultimately a foreign tax offence committed at all, provided only 
that there would have been an offence if the necessary conduct 
had been committed in England. The absence of any statutory 
requirement for the conduct committed abroad actually to 
contravene the law of the country where it occurred can only 
make sense on the assumption that the requirements and 
characteristics of criminal conduct in the two jurisdictions are 
assumed to be effectively the same, as in the simple theft 
example set out above. It can readily be assumed that all civilised 
countries will treat theft as criminal conduct, and everyone is 
assumed to know what, in essence, theft is.
Laws of extradition
Despite the force of the points set out above, there is a 
formidable counter-argument, based primarily upon the attempt 
to draw an analogy with the law of extradition. In R v Chief 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex. parte Secretary oj State Jor the 
Home Department [1988] 1 WLR 1204, the Divisional Court 
refused to apply the Government of India v Taylor principle to an 
extradition case, which arose under the Extradition Act 1870. An 
earlier case, namely R v Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte 
Khubchandani [1980] 71 Cr App Rep 241 was not followed in 
that case, and certain dicta of Stuart-Smith LJ indicate that the 
Government of India v Taylor principle has no application at all to 
the criminal law. The case deserves close attention.
As a matter of principle, it is surely obvious that the Government 
of India v Taylor principle should have no application to the law of 
extradition. The principle is concerned with the enforcement by 
the English court of foreign tax law. Extradition is the opposite 
process, namely the granting of judicial assistance by the English 
courts to enable foreign courts to try those suspected of criminal 
conduct in those foreign states. The policy considerations are 
directly opposite to those which arose in Government of India v 
Taylor, and which arise in relation to the 1993 Act. With respect 
to the Court in Khubchandani it is hard to see how it could 
possibly be a legitimate answer to a valid extradition request to 
say that the English court, as the extraditing court, cannot and 
should not enforce foreign revenue law. It seems to me that the 
court in the second case was plainly right to be unimpressed by 
the argument based on the Government oj India v Taylor principle.
However, it is essential to read the judgment in that case on the 
basis that it is concerned with extradition, and not with the 
indictment in England of a person charged with the 
contravention of foreign tax law.
OFF-SHORE ACTIVITIES
The most remarkable feature of the new legislation is its 
extension, through s. 93A(7), to the facilitation of criminal 
conduct taking place outside the UK. It should be noted that 
Part I of the 1993 Act, which has not yet been brought into 
effect, seeks to extend the jurisdiction of the UK courts in 
respect of offences with significant foreign elements.
In 1988, when the case was argued, the 1993 Criminal Justice 
Act had not even been thought of. The concept of someone being 
put through the English criminal courts for breach of a foreign 
tax statute would have seemed to the judges who decided that 
case to be novel. There was no precedent whatsoever for any 
such criminal jurisdiction, and therefore the references in the 
judgment to 'criminal' law were plainly intended as a reference, 
and only as a reference to the law of extradition itself, which for 
certain purposes at least is part of the criminal law. Any 
statement which might be derived from the judgment of Stuart 
Smith LJ to the effect that the Government oj India v Taylor 
principle does not apply to criminal proceedings can only mean 
criminal proceedings which are extradition proceedings. Thus, 
at p. 1218B, he said:
' ... This is an application of the Rule that our Courts will not 
enforce Joreign penal statutes in the absence of Treaty or specific 
legislation; but the Extradition Act and the Extradition Treaties are 
precisely the means by which inroads into that principle are made ...',
and in relation to a passage in Dicey and Morris, llth edn, at 
p. 100, he continued :
' ... This plainly relates to civil proceedings, since criminal 
jurisdiction in this country depends upon the crime being committed 
within the jurisdiction. It is treaty and convention, as given effect to in 
the Extradition Act, that enable Joreign penal laws to be enforced to the 
extent that they are extradition crimes, and offences under enactment 
relating to tax are not extradition crimes.'
It is clear that the court could not comprehend that criminal 
jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction to try a defendant, and not to 
extradite him) could arise at all in respect of conduct committed 
abroad, let alone the breach of foreign revenue law. Such a 
possibility being unthinkable, the court was only concerned as to 
the distinction between civil proceedings and extradition 
proceedings. If, contrary to the assumption in the judgment, it 
were possible (as it now is since 1993) for criminal jurisdiction 
to be founded (extradition apart) in respect of crimes committed 
abroad, or in respect of assistance given to laundering the 
proceeds of crimes committed abroad, then there will be every 
reason to treat such criminal proceedings according to the same 
principle as applies to civil proceedings, as opposed to the 
principle applying to extradition proceedings. The general 
philosophy underlying the application of the principle appears to 
apply to criminal proceedings of such a nature, which broadly 
speaking amount to an attempt to enforce foreign revenue laws,
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in clear contrast to the situation which arises on an extradition 
request by a foreign state, where by definition the English court 
is not exercising its own jurisdiction to try the defendant, but 
simply considering returning that person to a 'home' jurisdiction.
In the course of his judgment, Stuart Smith LJ referred to the 
decision of the House of Lords in Williams and Humbert Ltd v W &^ 
H Trademarks (Jersey) Limited [1986] AC 368, where Lord McKay 
of Clashfern said at p. 440 that, even in civil proceedings, there 
were limits on the application of the principle in Government of 
India v Taylor. However, there the facts were that the plaintiffs 
were seeking simply to recover property to which they were 
entitled, even though the Spanish Government lay behind the 
plaintiff's claim pursuant to certain expropriatory legislation. 
The plaintiff's claims against the defendants were not in any 
sense an enforcement of those expropriatory laws, and thus the 
House of Lords had little difficulty in disapplying any rule of law 
based upon the principle in Government of India v Taylor. It does 
not seem to me that the dicta of Lord McKay in that case have 
any effect upon the issue which is under consideration here.
The arguments based on the analogy with extradition go one 
stage further. In 1989 English extradition law was radically
O to J
reformed by the Extradition Act 1989. This introduced the 
concept of an 'extradition crime', which is dealt with in Section
11 of the 1989 Act. Extradition crime means :
'(a) Conduct in the territory of a foreign state, a designated 
Commonwealth country or a colony which, if it occurred in the UK, 
would constitute an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term oj
12 months, or any greater punishment, and which however described in 
the law of the foreign state, Commonwealth country or colony, is so 
punishable under that law
It is suggested that there is some similarity between the 
wording of this section and s. 93A(7) of the 1988 Act (as 
substituted by the 1993 Act). It has to be said that this similarity 
is not particularly close, although some similarities certainly 
exist. For the purposes of extradition, it is sufficient for a crime 
to constitute an 'extradition crime' if, although committed 
abroad, it would have constituted a serious punishable offence 
had it occurred in England. It is suggested that s. 93A(7) should 
be construed in similar fashion, with the addition of the 
application of the approach exemplified in the Osman case 
(referred to above) to the effect that the translation of conduct 
from the foreign country to England should be accompanied by 
all the elements of the offence which took place in that country 
(which in an extradition case would usually mean the requesting 
state), although perhaps not any other conduct occurring in a 
third country.
It does not seem to me that this argument has much force. 
Quite apart from the points made above as to the vital difference 
between extradition proceedings and true criminal proceedings, 
there is simply no reason why the two different statutes should 
be construed in the same way. The concept of the notional 
transfer of conduct from the requesting state to the extraditing 
state is a familiar one in extradition law, but a wholly unfamiliar 
and radical departure for the criminal law proper. It does not 
seem to me that the English courts should construe a statute
O
conferring original criminal jurisdiction upon the UK courts by 
reference to any wider than necessary construction, especially if 
the comparator statute is one which deals with the wholly 
different topic of extradition.
PARLIAMENT'S INTENTION
As stated above, little clue can be derived trom the 
parliamentary debate which attended the passing of the original 
legislation as to its application to foreign fiscal offences. It was 
only after the change of government in 1997 that any statements 
came to be made by or on behalf of the UK Government to the 
effect that this legislation applied to tax-related offences at all. In 
the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group Guidelines published in 
June 1997, the statement is made that 'tax related offences are 
not in a special category'- That seems to be uncontroversial but 
does not deal with the question of foreign tax offences. The 
following words also appear:
' ... financial institutions may not be in a position to judge whether 
a customer has paid tax due in another country. They are not under a 
duty to investigate.'
Whilst this may be reassuring on the practical level, it appears 
to suggest that the legislation does indeed apply in principle to 
foreign tax evasion. The UK government's attitude to tax evasion 
generally and the role of the remaining British offshore 
jurisdictions has changed significantly since 1997, and it may be 
that there is now governmental support lor the idea that the 
1993 money laundering legislation can and should be applied to 
those who assist in the retention of the proceeds of foreign tax 
evasion. Whether or not that is the case, it does not seem that 
the legislation, when passed, either had that object or was 
intended to extend so far beyond the ambit of the EC directive.
That there are two schools of thought on this issue cannot be 
doubted. If the view based upon the analogy with extradition is 
well founded, it significantly increases the risk that professionals 
dealing in investment, tax or legal advice here might become
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embroiled in breach of the criminal law. Because of the 
comparatively low threshold of 'suspicion', it will be very 
difficult to be certain in many situations that a particular client 
has not been engaged in or benefited to some extent from some 
evasion of foreign tax law. Although it is clearly not incumbent 
upon the English professional to research the foreign tax law, the 
application of s. 93A(7) to such facts will potentially bring within 
the ambit of the criminal statute many situations which arise 
regularly in practice. The problem of identifying the 'proceeds' 
of such criminal conduct will be one factor in inhibiting 
prosecutions of this nature, whilst another will obviously be the 
doubt as to whether the act applies to foreign fiscal offences at 
all. I am not aware of any fiscal offence case yet where the act has 
been used. I doubt whether there will be one, at least until and 
unless the authorities have established a reasonably firm basis for 
the operation of the act in relation to what might be described 
as more traditional money laundering activities. @
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